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HOW NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST AND FOREIGN
POLICY CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE THE
U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM
Meital Waibsnaider*
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001,1 a group of forty-four Afghan refugees, made up
of mostly widows and orphans, had their long-awaited flight to the United
States cancelled.2 Everyone in the group had passed the difficult process of
interviews and medical screenings required to obtain refugee status, 3
allowing them to enter and resettle4 in the United States, but they would
never arrive. One American newspaper at the time called the refugees'
dilemma "especially grim." 5 For several months after September 11, the
United States suspended refugee admissions. 6
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
family and friends for their tremendous support throughout the writing process, and
Professor Jennifer Gordon for her invaluable guidance.
1. On September 11, 2001, four American airplanes carrying passengers were hijacked.
Two of the planes were flown into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, one
was flown into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth crashed in a field in
Pennsylvania. See generally Serge Schmemann, President Vows to Exact Punishment for
"Evil, "N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
2. Editorial, A Simple Twist of Fate, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 2001, at B6.
3. Under the 1980 Refugee Act, a refugee is defined as a person with a "well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2000). But see David Rohde, U.S. Urged to End Bias in Policy Toward Refugees, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Aug. 11, 1994, at 1 (stating that "critics call the U.S. definition [of refugee]...
being persecuted in the right country, by the right government, at the right time").
4. When a refugee is resettled in the United States, he or she is entitled to receive
access to
sufficient resources for employment training and placement in order to achieve
economic self-sufficiency... as quickly as possible[,] ... the opportunity to
acquire sufficient English language training to... become effectively resettled as
quickly as possible[,] ... cash assistance.., in such a manner as not to
discourage.., economic self-sufficiency[, and] ... insur[ance] that women have
the same opportunities as men to participate in training and instruction.
INA § 412(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(1)(A). A refugee who has been resettled and
physically present in the United States for at least one year is eligible to adjust his or her
status to become a legal permanent resident. Id.
5. A Simple Twist of Fate, supra note 2, at B6.
6. U.S. Dep't of State et al., Forward to Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year
2003: Report to the Congress (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/2002/13892.htm [hereinafter State Dep't 2003
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Admissions of overseas refugees to the United States have rebounded,
but not nearly to their pre-September 11 levels.7 This Note examines
policies towards overseas refugees rather than asylum-seekers. While under
the definition in the 1980 Refugee Act every asylum-seeker is also a
refugee, because asylum-seekers fear persecution in their home country, 8
overseas refugees differ from asylum-seekers because they have not yet
reached the United States, but can nevertheless qualify for refugee status.9
In contrast, asylum-seekers have already reached the United States. At
present, five years after the terrorist attacks on September 11, overseas
refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq have been almost shut out of the
refugee program.10 America's "war on terror,"' l and specifically the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, appears to be the primary motivation for the
changes in refugee admissions from Afghanistan and Iraq. 12  The
downward shift in admissions from these countries 13 is entirely consistent
with the history of the program, which has been based on national self-
interest and influenced by foreign policy practically since its inception. 14
For refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S.-led military
operations continue to foster conditions that create refugees, 15 but where the
United States has a strong incentive to claim that country conditions are
Report] (stating that "[c]oncerns regarding security for U.S. government personnel in the
months following September 11 resulted in a several month hiatus in Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) interviews worldwide and suspension of processing in some
locations altogether").
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See INA § 208(b)1, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (stating that an asylum-seeker is eligible for
asylum if the INS "determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
101(a)(42)(A)").
9. Compare INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (defining a refugee), with INA
§ 208(a)1, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (authorizing "[any alien who is physically present in the United
States or who arrives in the United States" to apply for asylum).
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. The White House defines the "war on terror" as a war against "[t]he ideology known
as Islamic radicalism, militant Jihadism, or Islamo-fascism--different from the religion of
Islam-[which] exploits Islam to serve a violent political vision that calls for the murder of
all those who do not share it." Press Release, White House, President Bush Remarks on the
War on Terror (Oct. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-2.html.
12. See infra Parts I.C, III.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. Theresa Sidebothom, Immigration Policies and the War on Terrorism, 32 Denv. J.
Int'l L. & Pol'y 539, 577 (2004) (stating that "the campaign against terrorism has made the[]
plight [of refugees fleeing fundamentalist Islam] worse, as the hostility of fundamentalist
groups has been stirred up against them"); see also Peter Beaumont, Abuse Worse than
Under Saddam, Says Iraqi Leader, The Observer (London), Nov. 27, 2005, at 1; Dexter
Filkins, Sunnis Accuse Iraqi Military of Executions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2005, at Al;
Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, Taliban Step Up Afghan Bombings and Suicide Attacks, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 2005, at A3; David Rohde, Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of
Failure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2006, at Al; David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, Delays Hurting
US. Rebuilding in Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 2005, at Al; Sabrina Tavemise,
Sectarian Hatred Pulls Apart Iraq"s Mixed Towns, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2005, at Al.
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improving, 16 the barring of admissions, like the cancelled flight of the forty-
four Afghans on September 11, has become the status quo. 17
The official refugee policy of the United States, as embodied by the 1980
Refugee Act ("the Act"), the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees ("the Convention"), 18 and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees ("the Protocol") 19 requires that foreign
policy play no role in refugee admissions. In fact, one of the primary goals
of the Act was to eliminate foreign policy bias altogether in the admission
of overseas refugees. 20  Since the terrorist attacks on September 11,
however, the United States has admitted far fewer overseas refugees than
have been admitted anytime since 1978.21 Additionally, the selection of
countries from which those refugees have been admitted appears to be
politically motivated.22  This Note examines the ways the American
16. See infra Parts I.B.1-2, III.
17. See infra Part I.C; see also Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United
States Post-September 11, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 323, 324 (2005) (stating that
"[a]lmost three years [after September 11, the U.S. refugee resettlement program] is still
running at only about two-thirds of its previous capacity; more than 100,000 refugees have
lost opportunities to build new lives in the United States during this period").
18. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3, July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter the Convention] (stating that "[c]ontracting
States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to
race, religion, or country of origin").
19. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter the Protocol].
20. See infra Part I.A.4; see also Tahl Tyson, Comment, The Refugee Act of 1980:
Suggested Reforms in the Overseas Refugee Program to Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns
from Competing Interests, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 921, 924 (1990) (stating that the definition of
"refugee" in the Act "on its face is ideologically and geographically neutral").
21. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State, Cumulative
Summary of Refugee Admissions, 1975-2003, at 5 (2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38023.pdf [hereinafter State Dep't 2003
Summary]; Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State, Summary of
Refugee Admissions Fiscal Year 2004, at 3 (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/37128.pdf [hereinafter State Dep't 2004
Summary].
22. See infra Parts 1.B, Il1.
[Amnesty International] has documented a significant 'backlash' against refugees
and asylum-seekers because of their national or ethnic origin or religious beliefs.
[Amnesty International] has called on governments to live up to their human rights
obligations by protecting those at risk, and has also joined the [United Nations
High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR)] in warning that making unwarranted
links between refugees and criminals or 'terrorists' may put already vulnerable
individuals in danger.
Amnesty Int'l, Refugee Protection Is Human Rights Protection: Amnesty International
Statement to the Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention
and/or Its 1967 Protocol, http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGIOR510112001 (last
visited Sept. 25, 2006). The UNHCR is the United Nations agency mandated to oversee
refugee protection worldwide. The Statute of the Office of the UNHCR states that the
UNHCR shall "provid[e] international protection" and "seek[] permanent solutions" to the
problems of refugees, and that "the work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely
non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to
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government's historical and current foreign policy bias and national self-
interest approach to the admission of overseas refugees contradict the goals
of the Act, the Convention, and the Protocol.23 It argues that when the
United States takes military action it claims is in the best interest of the
citizens of the country in which it interferes, 24 it should not simultaneously
close its borders to refugees that attain their status as a result of the military
action.25 Finally, this Note proposes that the United States has a moral
obligation to implement a refugee admissions program that includes the
refugees it created in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of the post-September
11 U.S.-led wars in those countries.26
Part L.A of this Note describes the development of the United States
refugee admissions program, which has been influenced by national self-
interest and foreign policy considerations since its inception. Part I.B
examines the current refugee crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the near
exclusion of refugees from these countries from the United States refugee
admissions program. Part II of this Note explores the three major models
that are typically cited as approaches to shaping a country's refugee
admissions program: (1) the national self-interest approach, (2) the
humanitarian approach, and (3) the human rights approach. Part III argues
that the current refugee admissions from Afghanistan and Iraq are in
keeping with the national self-interest approach and demonstrate the foreign
policy bias of the United States refugee admissions program. Part III
further argues that the United States has a moral obligation to accept
refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq who have attained their status as a
result of the war on terror, and proposes that the United States adopt a
hybrid of the human rights and humanitarian models in a way that includes
the admission of refugees the United States created as a result of military
action in countries it claims to be helping.
I. AMERICA'S HISTORICAL AND CURRENT APPROACH TO REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS
Part I of this Note details the development of the United States refugee
admissions program, which has been largely based on national self-interest
and influenced by foreign policy considerations. Part I also discusses the
refugee situations in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of the post-September
11 U.S.-led wars in these countries, and the composition of the United
States' post-September 11 refugee admissions program.
groups and categories of refugees." G.A. Res. 428 (V), ch. 1 (1), (2), U.N. Doc. A/1775
(Dec. 14, 1950).
23. See infra Parts I.A.4-5, IB, III.C.
24. See infra Parts I.B. 1-2.
25. See infra Parts I.B, III.
26. See infra Part III.
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A. The Development of a Refugee Admissions Program in the United States
that Is Primarily Based on National Self-Interest
Part L.A of this Note examines the development of the United States
refugee admissions program since World War II.
1. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
The first piece of American legislation to resettle refugees was the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA). 27 The DPA was Congress's
controversial response to the plight of millions of European refugees who
had nowhere to turn after World War 11.28 The DPA, however, was not the
open-door welcome that refugees might have expected after surviving the
War. The DPA required that those who applied for visas show that they
entered Allied zones in Germany, Austria, or Italy, on or before December
22, 1945,29 thereby limiting the admission of Jewish refugees, most of
whom fled to the Allied zones after this date.30 The original cut-off dates
by which refugees were required to enter Allied zones did not seem to
promote any political objective, yet in its application, the cut-off dates
hindered the vast majority of Jewish refugees from admittance to the United
States. 31 As a result, ninety percent of Jewish refugees were denied visas to
the United States and were excluded from the relief provided by the DPA. 32
The DPA was signed during a restrictive period in American immigration
history due to the fear of many Americans that refugees and other
immigrants would compete with them for jobs. 33 Some members of
Congress justified the restrictions based on the fear that a more "generous
treatment" of Jewish refugees would negatively impact the American
economy and social structure. 34 This restrictive period, however, also
coincided with the realization by some politicians that the refugee program
could be used as a political tool. 35 Such legislators began to look to refugee
27. Act of June 25, 1948 (Displaced Persons Act), ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948),
amended by Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (1950).
28. See Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The
Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 253,
261-64 (1995). "[B]ecause the Displaced Persons Act was fraught with restrictions designed
to favor groups other than surviving Jews it produced a storm of public protest." Id. at 262
n.90.
29. Displaced Persons Act, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009.
30. Bockley, supra note 28, at 263.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 921-22 (4th ed.
2005) (stating that "many [Americans] were unwilling to admit those with whom they would
be competing for jobs. Other Americans feared that the refugee population contained
subversive elements who would poison the United States with their radical views and their
activities," and that, "Anti-semitism was clearly an additional factor, though historians differ
as to its magnitude and its impact").
34. Bockley, supra note 28, at 261.
35. Id. at 261-62.
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policy to discredit communist regimes. 36 Thus, "[i]nstead of enacting
refugee legislation designed to provide protection for those most in need of
it, immigration policy came to be used as a [foreign policy] tool," whereby
"those fleeing from communist or communist-dominated nations [were
singled out] as the most deserving of refugee status." 37  While he
reluctantly acceded to public pressure and signed the DPA, President Harry
S. Truman made an unusually critical statement at the time when he said,
"[i]n its present form this bill is flagrantly discriminatory. It mocks the
American tradition of fair play.' 38
Due to the public outcry that followed the discriminatory admissions that
resulted from the DPA, the DPA was eventually amended in 195039 and
again in 1951.40 The first amendment extended protection to people fleeing
the communist regime in China, and the second revised the cut-off date to
allow people displaced after January 1, 1945 to be eligible for resettlement
in the United States.41 The DPA reflects two important themes in American
refugee policy: (1) the use of refugee admissions to promote a foreign
policy and preserve some national self-interest goal despite legislation that
is seemingly politically neutral, 42 and (2) the powerful impact of public
pressure to promote legislation favorable to refugees.43
2. Refugee Admissions to the United States During the Cold War
The use of refugee admissions as a tool in the Cold War battle against
communism, illustrated by the amendment of the DPA authorizing
admission of Chinese refugees, became the dominant theme of U.S. refugee
policy in the second half of the twentieth century.44 Of the 1.5 million
refugees admitted between the end of World War II and 1980, under two
thousand were from noncommunist countries.45 Throughout the Cold War,
countries that admitted refugees often did so out of a desire to discredit
those with an opposing ideology and in an attempt to bolster their own
public image.46 Refugee admissions were essentially used as a propaganda
tool to "'win the hearts and minds' of the world's peoples" 47 by showing
36. Id. at 262.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 263 (quoting Signing of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Statement by the
President, July 4, 1948, Dep't St. Bull., July 1948, at 21).
39. An Act to Amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat.
219 (1950).
40. An Act to Clarify the Immigration Status of Certain Aliens, Pub. L. No. 82-14, 65
Stat. 28 (1951).
41. Id. at 222, 219; see also Bockley, supra note 28, at 264 n.107.
42. See Bockley, supra note 28, at 263.
43. See infra Parts I.A.5-6.
44. Bockley, supra note 28, at 271.
45. Id.
46. Julie Mertus, The State and the Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: New Models, New
Questions, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 59, 65 (1998).
47. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing the Impact of US. Refugee
Resettlement, 36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 951, 981 (2003).
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that the citizens of a disfavored regime were "voting with their feet by
leaving." 48
In this vein, throughout the 1950s, the United States accepted refugees
fleeing communist regimes in Poland, Yugoslavia, and China via ad hoc
legislative and administrative action taken by Congress.49 In the early
1960s, the United States continued to embrace refugees "based largely on
Cold War politics." '50 The United States was most concerned about luring
scientists and artists from the Soviet Union to flee the communist regime in
an effort to one-up Soviet officials in the propaganda war.51 The United
States was also so eager to accept refugees from President Fidel Castro's
communist Cuba that consular offices that processed Cuban visa
applications often forewent routine criminal background checks.52
Meanwhile, refugees from countries whose governments the United States
supported, such as Haiti, found little to no refuge in the United States. 53
The Cold War, and the refugee admissions it produced, are the clearest
demonstration of foreign policy bias in the U.S. refugee admissions
program.54
3. The President's Parole Power and the 1965 Conditional Entry Program
The President's parole power, which allows him or her to admit
individuals into the country at will but without granting the parolee any
protection against future removal from the country, has been deployed in
ways that illustrate foreign policy bias in the admission of refugees 55 and is
an important stepping stone to understanding why Congress eventually
passed the politically neutral Refugee Act of 1980.56 The parole power was
intended primarily as a temporary measure, 57 but by 1965, it became a
numerically significant part of the country's immigration system.58
48. Id.
49. Id. at 956; see also Act of September 11, 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 643
(1957) (amending the Refugee Relief Act by defining "refugee" as a person who has fled
any "Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist occupied area"); Act of Aug. 7,
1953, Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), amended by Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044
(1954); Bockley, supra note 28, at 265 (stating that the Refugee Relief Act was intended as a
temporary measure, as opposed to a permanent refugee admissions program, to "address
important American concerns about the prevention of the spread of communism").
50. Bockley, supra note 28, at 269.
51. Mertus, supra note 46, at 65.
52. Bockley, supra note 28, at 269.
53. Id. at 272-76, 273 (explaining that "[d]espite evidence to the contrary, Haitian
refugees... worked against a powerful presumption that they were not victims of
persecution," but rather were seeking refuge for economic reasons).
54. Id. (stating that "[t]he staggering difference in the numbers of Haitians and Cubans
admitted before 1980 dramatically reveals the impact of foreign policy on immigration
decisions").
55. Id. at 268.
56. Id. at 281.
57. Id. at 267.
58. Id. at 269 (explaining that "[t]he Kennedy Administration used parole authority to
admit hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees").
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Frustrated by the lack of a unified refugee policy, the unreviewable
executive discretion that the parole power provided, and the absence of
meaningful opportunities for Congress to influence national policy
regarding refugees, 59 Congress adopted a preference category for immigrant
visas that essentially created a conditional refugee entry program in 1965.60
The preference category, which imposed an annual ceiling of 17,400
admissions, expressly included a clear foreign policy bias: It offered refuge
to those who feared persecution and were fleeing either a "Communist-
dominated" country or a country "within the general area of the Middle
East. '61 Two problems with this program eventually emerged: The annual
ceiling of 17,400 was drastically low considering the number of worldwide
refugees, and presidents frequently bypassed the conditional entry program
and continued to use their parole power to admit large numbers of refugees
as they saw fit.6 2
4. The Incorporation of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees into
United States Refugee Policy via the 1980 Refugee Act
In 1980, Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act, the first comprehensive
American refugee legislation.63 One of the primary goals of the Act was to
do away with the foreign policy bias that characterized refugee admissions
in the United States in the preceding years. 64 The Act essentially replicates
the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 65 and is the domestic
statutory law governing overseas refugees in the United States.66 The
Convention, which established international standards for the treatment of
refugees, was codified after World War II "[i]n a spirit of empathy and
59. Id. at 281.
60. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911 (1965), repealed in part by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (2000) (under the program,
conditional entry meant that a person admitted through this preference category could apply
for adjustment of status to permanent residence after two years).
61. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. at 913.
62. See Bockley, supra note 28, at 277 (stating that "[w]ith each successive group of
refugees and subsequent exercise of parole power, Congress became more skeptical about
the... ad hoc administration of refugee policy").
63. At the time, Senator Edward Kennedy stated that "[a] comprehensive asylum policy
for refugees is long overdue." Proposed Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act: Hearings on H.R. 9112, H.R. 15092 and H.R. 17370 Before Subcomm. No. I of the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1970).
64. See Tyson, supra note 20, at 924.
65. While the United States was not a signatory to the Convention, it indirectly became a
party to it by acceding to the Protocol in 1968. United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force
Nov. 1, 1968).
66. Legomsky, supra note 33, at 931.
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humanitarianism, and with a hope that such widespread suffering might be
averted in the future."67
Article 1 of the Convention defines "refugee" as a person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.68
The fundamental premise of the Convention has proved to be enduring and
was furthered by the Protocol. 69 The Protocol, however, expanded the
Convention's scope by removing the geographical limit in its definition of
refugee to European refugees who had fled as a result of the events
occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951.70 The Protocol also requires
signatory states to apply the provisions of the Convention "without
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin." 71 Additionally, the
Convention and Protocol allow signatory parties to exclude certain people
from protection, including those who have committed "a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity," "serious non-political
crime[s]," and those "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations." 72
The Convention and the Protocol were replicated almost entirely in the
Act, which provides the first United States statutory definition of the word
"refugee." 73 The definition in the Act is modeled exactly after that of the
Convention, as amended by the Protocol, with the exception that it does not
specifically require a refugee to be outside or inside his or her country of
nationality or habitual residence. 74 The definition of "refugee" adopted by
the Act specifically excludes any mention of ideological limitations.75
The actual selection of refugees under the Act primarily involves the
President, Congress, the State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM), and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), with the President exercising "[r]elatively unfettered choice...
67. Marilyn Achiron, A 'Timeless' Treaty Under Attack, Refugees Magazine, July 1,
2001, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.htm?tbl=PUBL&page=home&id
=3cdf d3e 19.
68. The Convention, supra note 18, art. 1 (A)(2).
69. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee
Law, 31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 129, 143 (1990).
70. The Protocol, supra note 19, art. 3.
71. The Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.
72. Id. art. 1(F)(a)-(c).
73. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (2000).
74. Id.
75. See Bockley, supra note 28, at 280.
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every step of the way."' 76 The Act authorizes the President to make the
annual determination of how many refugees may be admitted in the
upcoming fiscal year, with no upper or lower limits on the numbers, and it
also includes a requirement that the President consult with Congress before
making any numerical determinations.7 7 The presidential determination
applies to the regions from which refugees may be admitted. The PRM,
which accepts and screens refugee applications, and the Refugee Corps of
the DHS, which is comprised of officers from the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services and makes the individual determination of refugee
status, then apply certain "processing priorities" to determine which
refugees from each region will be admitted. The processing priorities are
established yearly as part of the annual proposed refugee admissions78 and
are heavily influenced by the executive branch. 79
In the decade following the passing of the Act, refugee admissions did
not reflect the Act's politically neutral language. 80 Instead, the United
States continued to admit mostly refugees from communist countries. 8 1
Throughout the 1980s, the average approval rate for refugee status was
twenty-five percent, while the percentage approval rate for refugees who
76. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 961. "The number of refugees accepted each year is set
by a political process. This number bears very little relation to existing need." Id. at 970.
77. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at INA
§ 207(a), (d), (e), 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (2000)).
78. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6. The State Department's proposed processing
priorities for 2006 are as follows:
Priority 1: Individual Referrals
Priority 1 is reserved for individuals with compelling protection needs or those
for whom no other durable solution exists who are identified and referred to the
program by UNHCR, a U.S. Embassy, or a non-governmental organization
(NGO). This processing priority is available to persons of any nationality.
Priority 2: Group Referrals
Priority 2 is used for groups of special humanitarian concern to the United
States designated for resettlement processing. It includes specific groups (within
certain nationalities, clans, or ethnic groups) identified by the Department of State
in consultation with [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)], non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), UNHCR, and other experts. Some Priority 2
groups are processed in their country of origin.
Priority 3: Family Reunification Cases
Priority 3 is extended to nationals of certain countries who are the spouses,
unmarried children under 21, or parents of persons admitted to the United States as
refugees or granted asylum, or persons who are lawful permanent residents or U.S.
citizens and were initially admitted to the United States as refugees or granted
asylum. Eligible nationalities are developed following review of UNHCR's
annual assessment of refugees in need of resettlement and ongoing repatriation
programs and opportunities.
U.S. Dep't of State et al., Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2006: Report to the
Congress 8-10 (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52475.pdf
[hereinafter State Dep't 2006 Report]. Afghanistan and Iraq are eligible nationalities for
Priority 3 in 2006. Id. at 10.
79. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 961.
80. See Bockley, supra note 28, at 282-83.
81. Id. at 283.
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fled communist countries was between fifty and eighty percent. 82 "The
dramatic differences between the numbers of approved refugees departing
from politically 'unfriendly' regimes and those originating from policy-
neutral countries reveals the continuing influence of foreign policy on
refugee policy decision-making" throughout the 1980s.83
5. The Shift in Refugee Admissions After the Fall of the Berlin Wall
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,84 the refugee admissions
program has shifted away from a concentrated focus on refugees from
communist countries. 85 This shift, however, has not resulted in a rise in
refugee admissions from noncommunist countries, but rather a decrease in
overall refugee admissions. 86 Security concerns as well as concerns about
preserving American culture have contributed to a refugee program and
overall immigration program that tends towards a restrictive approach.87 In
this post-Cold War era, many
[w]ould-be receiving states and donors can no longer tell whom they are
supposed to help based on clear-cut ideological grounds.... Receiving
states talk less about the human rights of the uprooted and more about
their own rights. For instance, they talk about their right to protect their
own culture and standard of living from the foreign intruders and about
the larger "security dimension." 88
One area in which refugee admissions have increased since the fall of the
Berlin Wall is for refugees who flee their home countries for religious
reasons. In 1989, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment, which
amended the Act to codify "cultural preferences." 89 The specific cultural
preferences cited create a presumption of refugee status for Soviet Jews and
Pentecostals, active members of the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Serge Schmemann, Wall Opened at Old Center of Berlin, and Mayors Meet,
Communists Call Congress, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at Al.
85. See Mertus, supra note 46, at 66.
86. Legomsky, supra note 33, at 933 (stating that "because United States refugee policy
has been driven so strongly by Cold War politics, the net effect of the geopolitical changes
was a decline in total United States refugee admissions, rather than a redistribution").
87. See Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, and the
Movements of People, 36 Int'l Law. 91, 92 (2002) (explaining that "the main challenge
currently facing policy makers is to maintain the openness of society and.. . the openness of
the United States to the world. The post-September 11 th backlash against migrants, asylum
seekers, and refugees threatens to undermine a clear comparative advantage"); see also
Volker Tiurk, Forced Migration and Security, 15 Int'l J. Refugee L. 113, 114 (2003) (stating
that "refugees... are increasingly perceived themselves as a threat. Discussion is often
regrettably misinformed and sometimes suggests, for instance, that the international refugee
instruments provide a safe haven to terrorists and extend immunity from criminal
prosecution").
88. Mertus, supra note 46, at 66.
89. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599D, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261-63 (1989)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2000)).
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Orthodox Churches, and certain groups of Vietnamese. 90 The "presumption
of persecution" for members of these religious and national groups means
that a "[DHS] officer [is] to presume an individual [in these groups] to be a
refugee unless there [is] persuasive contrary evidence." 9 1
The Lautenberg Amendment, which has been renewed on a yearly basis
since its passage, sailed through Congress in much the same way as the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948-on a wave of public pressure. 92
Proponents touted the "alleged hypocrisy" of the United States, which had
"press[ed] the Soviet Union to let Jews [and others] emigrate while [later]
denying [them] admission to the United States on the grounds that they
were not persecuted. '93 Opposition to the Lautenberg Amendment centered
around the perceived preferential treatment of a group of people who were
seen as having summoned extraordinary political influence to get the
Amendment passed.94  Some critics also thought the Amendment
contradicted the national-preference neutrality that the Act appears to
require.9 5
6. Incidents of Uncharacteristic Treatment of Refugees
In contrast to refugees the United States has admitted in order to
embarrass political foes, there have also been instances when the United
States has admitted refugees in response to a moral obligation, regardless of
how it appeared politically. Refugees the United States created, as they are
often referred to, were twice admitted after the failed involvement of the
U.S. government in the affairs of foreign countries: first, with Hungarian
refugees in 1956, and next with Vietnamese refugees upon the conclusion
of the Vietnam War.
a. Hungarian Refugees in 1956
The admission of Hungarian refugees to the United States after the
Hungarian revolution against the 1956 invasion by the communist Soviet
Union was an instance in which the United States admitted refugees in
90. Id.
91. Victor Rosenberg, Refugee Status for Soviet Jewish Immigrants to the United States,
19 Touro L. Rev. 419, 433 (2003).
92. Id. at 434-35.
93. Id. at 435.
94. Id. at 434.
95. Id. (explaining that "Republican Representative Lamar Smith of Texas saw such
preference to selected groups as a bad precedent and also as unfair: 'We are saying basically
that whoever gets in line and whoever finds a political champion or whoever has enough
political influence, that they can perhaps get special attention, get special preference.'
Democratic Representative Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky saw it as 'a step backward,'
counter to the Refugee Act of 1980, which eliminated national preferences in granting
refugee status").
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response to a moral obligation rather than its national self-interest.96 The
Soviet army entered Hungary after a new, anticommunist government was
installed as a result of a popular uprising.97 Once the Soviet invasion
gained strength, many Hungarians began to flee the country for nearby
Austria and Yugoslavia. 98 The United States then sent large supplies of aid
to advance the revolt against the Soviet army, and the CIA smuggled arms
to Hungary's "freedom fighters." 99  At the height of the conflict, daily
television coverage in America portrayed the Hungarian fighters as
"heroes." 100  Once the Hungarian revolt was crushed, however, "the
disparity between the rhetoric of liberation and America's passive
response" was evident, 10 1 and the United States eventually admitted nearly
40,000 Hungarian refugees, more than was admitted by any other country
following the failed revolution. 10 2  While the foreign policy bias in
accepting the Hungarian refugees was clear in that the United States was
admitting refugees fleeing the invasion of a communist regime, the
Hungarian refugees were also accepted out of a sense of moral obligation
that they had been "victims of false expectations about U.S. policy," and
that "refugee relief [should be provided] in lieu of the military aid that had
been withheld." 10 3
Similarly, after the United States left Vietnam in the wake of the Vietnam
War, the United States admitted many of the refugees it had created through
its military withdrawal. The incident is discussed below.
b. Refugees After the Vietnam War
Beginning in 1975, many Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugees
were similarly resettled in the United States after the United States ceased
its military participation in the Vietnam War. 104 By 1975, the failure of
America's military action to defeat communism in Southeast Asia, and
Vietnam in particular, had become imminent, and many Americans wanted
to "wipe[] the slate clean" with a complete disengagement from the
region. 10 5 After nearly twenty years of political, economic, and eventually
military involvement fighting communist regimes in the area, the United
96. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 978 (explaining that the revolt was partly instigated by
CIA-trained agents).
97. Bockley, supra note 28, at 266.
98. Gil Loescher & John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's
Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present 52-53 (1986).
99. Id. at 53.
100. Id. at 52.
101. Id. at 52-53 (explaining that "even after it had become clear that the Soviet army was
again in control, Radio Free Europe repeated the slogan 'America will not fail you...
America will not fail you.. .' over and over again").
102. Id. at 52; see also Steinbock, supra note 47, at 978 n. 118 (explaining that most of the
Hungarians admitted had not even taken part in the revolt).
103. Loescher & Scanlan, supra note 98, at 54.
104. See, e.g., Steinbock, supra note 47, at 978-80.
105. See Loescher & Scanlan, supra note 98, at 102, 120 (internal quotations omitted).
2006] 403
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
States was ready to withdraw but feared the reprisals facing those who had
supported their efforts. 106
The admission of a "Vietnamese refugee population stemmed from
political sympathy to the former Vietnamese allies who had fought with the
United States.... Many Americans felt a sense of obligation to a people
that the United States had supported and then abandoned."'01 7 While the
admission of Vietnamese refugees at this time also demonstrated a political
bias in that the United States offered refuge to those fleeing a communist
regime, this bias differed from the typical national self-interest approach in
that it stemmed from the acknowledgment of a "moral responsibility" that
arose from botched American actions. 10 8 "Regarding the crisis primarily in
humanitarian and political terms rather than as an ideological
opportunity... the White House, the military, and the State Department all
committed themselves to a program of limited scope and duration dedicated
to rescuing America's Vietnamese allies."'10 9
Part L.A of this Note explored the development of the U.S. refugee
admissions program, which was largely based on national self-interest and
influenced by foreign policy. This Note now turns to describing the current
refugee crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the changes in the U.S. refugee
admissions program since September 11, 2001.
B. The Impact of the U.S.-Led Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on Refugees
in the Region and the Influence of Foreign Policy and National Self-Interest
on the United States Refugee Admissions Program Since September 11,
2001
Part I.B of this Note discusses the current refugee crises in Afghanistan
and Iraq as a result of the U.S.-led wars there, and the changes in the U.S.
refugee admissions program since September 11.
Internal persecution and external conflict have created refugees from
Afghanistan and Iraq for at least the last three decades. 110 The post-
September 11 U.S.-led wars in these countries, however, have fostered
106. See id. at 102-19. "Top secret telegrams were sent out to all embassies in the
Southeast Asian nations inquiring whether their governments would be willing to receive
Cambodians and Vietnamese in the event of Communist military victories." Id. at 103.
107. Bockley, supra note 28, at 276.
108. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 978.
109. Loescher & Scanlan, supra note 98, at 102. Loescher and Scanlan explain that
"[t]he backing of the Ford administration, the dominance of the Department of State in the
decision-making structure, media support, and the lack of serious resistance among the
public permitted the rescue policy to proceed with a minimum of political fallout." Id. at
103.
110. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 117
(2004), available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/nhdr/af-files/afnhdr2004-complete.pdf
[hereinafter Afghanistan: National Human Development]; Press Release, White House,
Past Repression and Atrocities by Saddam Hussein's Regime (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030404-1.html (explaining that for over
twenty years Saddam Hussein was notorious for human rights abuses and attempts to quiet
political dissent).
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conditions in both places that have either created refugees out of people
who were previously not endangered, or allowed conditions to fester, which
continuously place people in danger of losing their lives.11
Simultaneously, compared with its earlier rates of admission and the rates
of admission from other countries, the United States has practically ceased
offering Afghans and Iraqis refuge through its refugee admissions
program. 112
1. Afghanistan
Over the last three decades, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has led to
four distinct occurrences of population displacement.' 1 3 The last of these
displacements was caused by the U.S. war, which began in October 2001 in
retaliation for the terrorist attacks of September 11.114 For many years,
Afghanistan has been the country from which the largest numbers of
refugees originate worldwide, and in 2005,115 four years after the U.S.
military activities in the country began, this trend continued. 116 The global
number of refugees reached 8.4 million in 2005; of those 8.4 million,
approximately 1.9 million were Afghani."17
Indeed, the major refugee-producing events in Afghanistan's history have
all been related to military conflict. 118 The Soviet invasion in 1979, which
by 1983, forced 3.9 million Afghans to flee, signaled the first wave of
displacement in recent history. 119 In the wake of the Soviet Union's
withdrawal, warring between Mujahideen 120 factions seeking to gain
111. See Human Rights Watch, A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent
Groups in Iraq 113 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iraqlO05/iraql005.pdf
[hereinafter A Face and a Name]; Rohde & Gall, supra note 15, at Al.
112. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6; U.S. Dep't of State et al., Proposed Refugee
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2004: Report to the Congress 38 (2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/44529.pdf [hereinafter State Dep't 2004
Report]; U.S. Dep't of State et al., Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2005:
Report to the Congress, 37, 38, 45-46 (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36228.pdf [hereinafter State Dep't 2005
Report]; State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78, at 38-40, 51.
113. Under the definition of "refugee" in the Act, internally displaced people within their
country of origin may still be considered refugees. See INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(42) (2000).
114. See Editorial, The Ground War Begins, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2001, at A22 ("The
goals seem clear. The Pentagon is initially looking to destabilize and topple the Taliban
leadership, first by bombing, now by pursuing individual leaders. The bigger target is
Osama bin Laden and his followers").
115. The most recent year for which the UNHCR has published statistics regarding
worldwide refugees is 2005. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, 2005 Global Refugee Trends
(June 9, 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/ (select 2005 Global
Refugee Trends for the full report).
116. Id. at 3, 4.
117. Id.
118. See Afghanistan: National Human Development, supra note 110, at 117.
119. Id.
120. The Mujahideen were the western-backed Afghan guerrilla fighters in the war
against the Soviet Union. Id. at 95.
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control increased. 121 The persecution practiced by the Taliban 122 in the
following years further led to the displacement of a terrorized population,
and finally, the U.S.-led air strikes in October 2001, and the resulting
instability due to the war, marked the fourth major refugee-producing event
in recent Afghan history. 123 Soon after September 11, many Afghans
anticipated the United States' military retaliation and attempted to flee the
country through Iran and "Pakistan.124  Large numbers of the fleeing
refugees, however, were stopped at closed borders, and "[w]ith neither the
option of seeking security in neighboring countries nor in their homeland,
many Afghans remained internally displaced, worsening the already
precarious humanitarian situation."'125
Since major military operations were concluded in late 2001 and the
Transitional Authority 126 gained control in 2002, many Afghans have
returned to their homes, 127 but with mixed, and not always positive, results.
In March 2004, Human Rights Watch reported that
the United States is maintaining a system of arrests and detention [in
Afghanistan] as part of its ongoing military and intelligence operations
that violates international human rights law and international
humanitarian law (the laws of war). In doing so, the United States is
endangering the lives of Afghan civilians, undermining efforts to restore
the rule of law in Afghanistan, and calling into question its commitment
to upholding basic rights. 128
Additionally, in many parts of Afghanistan, former warlords have continued
to "wield considerable influence,"' 29 and attacks by the Taliban are
increasing, 130 due in part to the United States' lack of attention to the
rebuilding of Afghanistan's infrastructure 13 1 and the Afghani and U.S.
121. Id.
122. "The Taliban ... rose out of the refugee camps in Pakistan, from where they brought
the conservative values .... The Taliban... were [initially] ... welcomed by the majority
of the Afghan population, which was traumatized by the behaviour of local Mujahideen
fighters." Id. But eventually, the Taliban enforced a very strict interpretation of Islam in
which television, music, and photography were banned, and girls and women were forbidden
from attending school or working without the accompaniment of a male relative. Id. at 96.
123. Id. at 117.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. The Transitional Authority was the temporary governing body entrusted to oversee
the transition of Afghanistan's government into a freely elected representative government.
Id. at 124.
127. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Afghan Refugee Statistics (Feb. 2005),
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdftbl=SUB SITES&id=421316072#
search=%22unhcr/o2Oafghan%20refugee%20statistics%20february%202005%22.
128. Afghanistan: National Human Development, supra note 110, at 83.
129. Somini Sengupta, Deadly Attacks Continue as Afghans Prepare to Vote, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 2005, at A7.
130. Gall & Schmitt, supra note 15, at A3 (stating that "United Nations and Afghan
officials have described the insurgency as taking a new, more brutal turn this year, with
beheadings, throats cut and the assassination of religious and tribal elders and of doctors").
131. Rohde & Gall, supra note 15, at Al.
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governments' inability to control neighboring Pakistan's tacit support of the
Taliban.132 An ongoing drought in the country has also contributed to the
refugee situation.1 33
In the midst of the chaos in Afghanistan, some signs of progress have
appeared. 134 These include two democratic national elections, an improved
health care system, and a rise in the amount of children attending school. 135
Since the conclusion of major military operations in Afghanistan, however,
the United States has had an interest in positively characterizing
developments there. 136 This interest has stemmed from different purposes
at different times. 137 In 2003, the United States had an interest in positively
characterizing developments in Afghanistan because it aimed to entice other
governments and nongovernmental organizations to contribute to the
rebuilding efforts there. 138  In 2004, when military operations were
underway in Iraq, 139 the interest stemmed from retaining the support of the
American public as well as the international community. 140 And, by 2005,
portraying events positively in Afghanistan became a propaganda tool
against the insurgency in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 141
Moved by the public messages and the positive developments, some
countries have begun sending Afghan refugees back to their country out of
a belief that they will be safe and a desire to stop providing refuge for
132. See Seth G. Jones, Op-Ed., The Danger Next Door, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2005, at
A19 (explaining that Pakistan's unwillingness to control Taliban training camps within its
borders and the inability of the United States and Afghanistan to challenge that inaction are
contributing factors to the increased Taliban attacks); Rohde, supra note 15, at Al (stating
that some southern towns in Afghanistan have become an "epicenter of ... Taliban
resurgence and an explosion in drug cultivation").
133. State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 36.
134. Rohde & Gall, supra note 15, at Al.
135. Id. (stating that "five times as many children [are] in school").
136. See Jeff Gerth, Military's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 2005, at Al ("After the Sept. 11 attacks forced many Americans to recognize the
nation's precarious standing in the Arab world, the Bush administration decided to act to
improve the country's image and promote its values... . What had begun as an ambitious
effort to bolster America's image largely devolved into a secret propaganda war to counter
the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan."); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Declares Major Combat in
Afghanistan to Be Over, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2003, at A21; see also Joel Brinkley &
Ruhullah Khapalwak, Rice, Visiting Violent Afghanistan, Still Finds Political Progress, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 2005, at A5 ("Ms. Rice said nothing about the violence unless asked and
remained focused on her message, as she usually does, unwilling to criticize the new state of
Afghanistan, which is in large part an American creation."); Mark Danner, Taking Stock of
the Forever War, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 11, 2005, at 45.
137. See Brinkley & Khapalwak, supra note 136, at A5; Danner, supra note 136, at 45;
Gerth, supra note 136, at A1; Schmitt, supra note 136, at A21.
138. Schmitt, supra note 136, at A21 (stating that "[tihe United States declared today that
major combat operations were over in Afghanistan, a step aimed largely at encouraging more
nations to join the international reconstruction effort here").
139. David E. Sanger with John F. Bums, Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles
Apparently Miss Hussein, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 2003, at Al (stating that the war in Iraq
began on March 19, 2003).




them. 142 Many Afghans have been deported unwillingly, however, and
argue that it is too soon for them to return to their country. 143 Additionally,
although the Afghan government and the United Nations High Commission
of Refugees (UNHCR) have said they have experienced success in the
repatriation of Afghan refugees, 144 "many returning refugees face further
displacement and thus become new [internally displaced persons due to the
unstable situation]: the cycle of human displacement has not yet been
broken." 145
While the United States has supported the emergence of a democratic
government since its 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the slow rate of
rebuilding since military operations have ceased has created a dire situation
for many refugees. 146 In late 2005, the New York Times reported that the
United States planned to withdraw 4000 of its troops stationed in
Afghanistan in the spring of 2006, and at the same time, foreign aid was
expected to drop. 147 While American officials quintupled their financial
assistance to Afghanistan in 2005 to $4.8 billion, in 2006, that amount was
reduced by thirty percent. 148 The slow rate of rebuilding in Afghanistan has
become "emblematic of what [Afghans] see as a wasteful, slow-moving
effort that benefits foreigners far more than themselves."' 149  "[B]oth
Afghan officials and foreign diplomats are assessing what has been
achieved during the past four years, and many are disturbed by what they
see."'150 While the United States has helped Afghanistan to progress since
the fall of 2001, the plight of many Afghan refugees continues to remain
"grim,"' 151 while the predominant portrayal by the United States and other
countries of events there is positive. 152
2. Iraq
The instability in Iraq, if not the total number of refugees, 153 is worse
than that in Afghanistan. 154 The toppling of Saddam Hussein and his
government and the consequent vacuum of structure has uncovered a
142. See, e.g., Rachel Martin, Deportations from Germany Rattle Afghans (NPR Morning
Edition radio broadcast Nov. 28, 2005).
143. Id.
144. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 127.
145. Afghanistan: National Human Development, supra note 110, at 117.
146. Rohde & Gall, supra note 15, at Al.
147. Id.
148. Rohde, supra note 15, at Al.
149. Rohde & Gall, supra note 15, at Al; see also Rohde, supra note 15, at AI (stating
that "over time, the lack of construction in rural provinces fueled Taliban propaganda claims
that Americans were enriching themselves and bringing only corruption to Afghanistan").
150. Rohde & Gall, supra note 15, at Al.
151. A Simple Twist of Fate, supra note 2.
152. Brinkley & Khapalwak, supra note 136, at A5; Danner, supra note 136, at 45; Gerth,
supra note 136, at Al; Schmitt, supra note 136, at A21; Martin, supra note 142.
153. In 2005, 262,142 refugees originated from Iraq. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
supra note 115.
154. See Danner, supra note 136, at 45.
[Vol. 75
THE REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM
vicious clash between different religious groups, which some observers
have predicted will spiral into civil war upon the military withdrawal of the
United States, if not sooner. 155 The struggle for political control between
the Shiite and Sunni Muslims is fueled by years of hatred between the
groups. The current struggle has led to an environment in which those in
the religious minority in their neighborhoods are fleeing their homes for
towns in which their religion represents the majority, 156 and in which young
men are kidnapped by men in police uniforms, tortured, and later found
dead with handcuffs still attached. 157 In late 2005, Ayad Allawi, Iraq's first
Prime Minister since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, said the current
human rights abuses in Iraq are "as bad as they were... and are even in
danger of eclipsing" those under Saddam Hussein. 158
In October of 2005, Human Rights Watch described the situation in Iraq
as "extremely unstable."'159 Specifically, the group noted that "[i]n addition
to a general absence of law and order in many parts of the country,
insurgent attacks and indiscriminate bombings... pos[e] a grave risk to
civilians. Individuals also risk kidnapping and assassination." 160 Human
Rights Watch has placed a large part of the blame for the current situation
in Iraq on the military activities conducted by the United States.161 In an
October 2005 report, the group stated as follows:
[T]he United States had a legal obligation under international
humanitarian law to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure,
as far as possible, public order and safety [in Iraq]-an obligation the
United States [has] failed to meet. U.S. and coalition forces largely stood
by as individual Iraqis and organized groups looted government offices,
155. Seymour M. Hersh, Up in the Air: Where Is the Iraq War Headed Next?, New
Yorker, Dec. 5, 2005, at 42, 54.
156. Tavernise, supra note 15, at Al ("[T]he complex webs of tribal affiliations and
social status that rule everyday life in Iraq do not always line up as simply as Shiite against
Sunni. But increasingly, despite the urging of some Shiite religious leaders and Sunni
politicians, the attacks have been. A mostly Sunni Arab fringe is carrying out vicious attacks
against civilians, often Shiites, while Shiite death squads are openly stalking Surmis for
revenge, and the Shiite-dominated government makes regular arrests in Sunni Arab
neighborhoods.... Some Iraqis, despite years of mass killings of Kurds and Shiites during
Mr. Hussein's rule, still argue that sectarian divides did not exist in Iraq before the American
invasion. But scratching just beneath the surface turns up hurt in most Shiite homes.").
157. Filkins, supra note 15, at Al ("Hundreds of accounts of killings and abductions have
emerged in recent weeks, most of them brought forward by Sunni civilians, who claim that
their relatives have been taken away by Iraqi men in uniform without warrant or
explanation.... The widespread conviction among Sunnis that the Shiite-led government is
bent on waging a campaign of terror against them is sending waves of fear through the
community.").
158. Beaumont, supra note 15 (reporting that Allawi claimed the Iraqi government, and
particularly the Ministry of Interior, was condoning torture).
159. Human Rights Watch, U.K.: Forced Return of Asylum-Seekers to Iraq (Aug. 19,
2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/08/19/iraql1642.htm [hereinafter U.K.: Forced
Return].
160. Id.
161. A Face and a Name, supra note 111, at 112.
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hospitals, and, most dangerously for the country's security, abandoned
police and army depots filled with arms and ammunition. 162
The United States has claimed several victories in Iraq since the 2003
invasion.163 The ousting and subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein, the
establishment of an interim government, and the democratic ratification of
an interim constitution are all among the improvements cited by the United
States. 164 As in Afghanistan, on the basis of these perceived victories,
many countries have begun sending Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers back
to Iraq.165
However, the UNHCR and many refugee organizations have strongly
cautioned against such returns of Iraqi refugees. 166 In a September 2004
Return Advisory issued by the UNHCR that remains in effect, the UNHCR
"'strongly advise[d]' states to suspend any forced returns of Iraqi nationals
'until further notice' and urged states to 'postpone the introduction of
measures which are intended to induce voluntary returns"' of both Iraqi
refugees and asylum-seekers. 167 It stands to reason that, if the situation in
Iraq is so precarious that refugees who have fled the country are urged not
to return, people within the country certainly have reason to fear remaining
there. ' 68
Part I.B of this Note discussed the status of refugees in Afghanistan and
Iraq primarily as a result of the U.S.-led wars in those countries. This Note
now turns to describe the impact of September 11 on the United States
refugee admissions program.
C. The Effect of September 11 on the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
Part I.C of this Note describes the changes in the United States refugee
admissions program since September 11.
While the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq remain unstable for many as
a result of the war on terror initiated after September 11, the United States
has simultaneously reduced refugee admissions from these countries to the
162. Id.
163. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush, Anticipating Violence and Low Sunni Turnout,
Accentuates the Positive in Iraqi Voting, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2005, at A13.
164. See id.
165. See, e.g., U.K.: Forced Return, supra note 159.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Return Advisory Regarding Iraqi
Asylum Seekers and Refugees 4 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.se/SE/Protect-refugees/pdf/Iraq-.sept-2004.pdf).
168. See Sabrina Tavemise, Iraq's Lethal Traffic: Warning! Anarchy Ahead, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 5, 2005, at Al (stating that "in a city of daylight assassinations and regularly
exploding cars, it is perhaps surprising that the most pervasive daily headache comes in the
far more ordinary form of snarled lines of traffic. ... With the virtual collapse of the state,
rules have fallen away and [Baghdad] seems almost to have caved in on itself in an
egocentric free-for-all.... And while in other capitals a traffic jam may cause you to miss a
meeting, in Baghdad it may get you kidnapped or even killed").
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point of near extinction. 169 While overall refugee admissions to the United
States have diminished since September 11, admissions from other
countries have not been nearly eliminated like those from Afghanistan and
Iraq.170 The detrimental effects of the war on terror have been twofold for
Iraqi and Afghan refugees-the humanitarian situation has worsened for
some, 171 and very few may now seek refuge by resettling in the United
States. 172
The downward shift in refugee admissions began immediately after
September 11. On September 28, 2001, the State Department banned all
refugees from entering the United States while security procedures were
"reviewed."' 173 On November 21, 2001, President George W. Bush
promised that the United States would accept 70,000 refugees in fiscal year
2002.174 Yet, in 2002, the overall number of refugee admissions dropped
dramatically to approximately 27,110.175 In 2003, the overall admissions
rose to approximately 28,400,176 and then, in 2004 to approximately
52,800.177 Refugee admissions for 2005 are expected to rise slightly 178 in
comparison to 2004 admissions, 179 which will amount to refugee
admissions that are far higher than those made in 2002 and 2003180 but are
still significantly lower than the pre-September 11 admission levels. 18 1 To
put the post-September 11 admission levels into context, it must be noted
that throughout the 1990s the United States admitted anywhere from
approximately 69,300 to 122,000 refugees per year, and that at its height in
1980, when the Presidential cap on the refugee admissions program was
231,700, the United States admitted 207,116 refugees. 182
169. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6; State Dep't 2004 Report, supra note 112, at
38; State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 45; State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78,
at 51.
170. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 4; State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra
note 21, at 3; State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 45; State Dep't 2006 Report, supra
note 78, at 51.
171. See Parts I.B.1-2.
172. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
173. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6.
174. Press Release, White House, Presidential Determination on Refugee Numbers (Nov.
21, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011121-
5.html..
175. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 5.
176. Id.
177. State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra note 21, at 3.
178. State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78, at 6. The final statistics from 2005 and
2006 have yet to be released.
179. State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra note 21, at 3.
180. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 5.
181. Id.; see also David Martin, The US Refugee Program in Transition, Migration
Information Source, May 1, 2005, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm
?ID=305 (stating that "[1]argely gone are the massive, steady, and more predictably
manageable programs that had dominated U.S. admissions since the passage of the Refugee
Act of 1980").
182. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 5; see also Martin, supra note 181.
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Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq make up the bulk of admissions from the
Near East and South Asia region, a region from which refugee admissions
have followed a different pattern than that mentioned above over the last
four years.183 The numbers of admitted refugees from other regions have
fluctuated more or less in accordance with the fluctuation of the overall
changes in admissions since September 11.184 In 2002 and 2003, when
U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were close to concluding and just
getting under way respectively, the rate of change in admissions from
Afghanistan and Iraq also corresponded to the overall rate of change in
refugee admissions. 185 By 2004, however, at which time the United States
had a vested interest in positively portraying the conflicts in both
countries 186 and therefore was not admitting refugees from them, the
admissions almost ceased.187 The extent to which admissions from the
Near East and South Asia have failed to rebound in proportion to
everywhere else is significant. 188
The per region numbers of refugee admissions since 2003 also
demonstrate the dichotomy between the Near East and South Asia, and
everywhere else. 189 Between 2003 and 2004, refugee admissions from
Africa rose from 10,717 to 29,125, and Latin American admissions rose
from 452 to 3556.190 Admissions from the Near East and South Asia,
however, decreased from 4260 to 2854.191 The projected admissions for
this region in 2005, a year in which overall admissions are expected to rise
slightly, continue the downward spiral to approximately 2000
admissions. 192 Of those 2000, the government expects to admit 1700
refugees from Iran and several hundred from Pakistan "and elsewhere in the
183. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6; State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at
4, 5; State Dep't 2004 Report, supra note 112, at 38; State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra note
21, at 1-3.
184. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6; State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at
4, 5; State Dep't 2004 Report, supra note 112, at 38; State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra note
21, at 1-3.
185. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 4, 5.
186. Brinkley & Khapalwak, supra note 136; Danner, supra note 136; Gerth, supra note
136; Schmitt, supra note 136.
187. State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 37, 38, 45; State Dep't 2006 Report,
supra note 78, at 38-40, 51. In 2004, only sixty-five Iraqis and approximately 910 Afghanis
were admitted to the United States. State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78, at 51. In
contrast, in 2001, prior to September 11, 2473 Iraqis and 2954 Afghanis were admitted as
refugees. State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6.
188. See State Dep't 2003 Report, supra note 6; State Dep't 2004 Report, supra note 112,
at 38; State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 45; State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note
78, at 51.
189. State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 45; State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note
78, at 51; State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 5; State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra
note 21, at 3.
190. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 5; State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra
note 21, at 1-2.
191. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 5; State Dep't 2004 Summary, supra
note 21, at 3.
192. State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78, at 42.
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[Near East and South Asia] region."' 93 The government claimed that
"[m]id-way through [fiscal year] 2005, the United States resumed active
processing of Iraqi cases, which had been on hold since 9/1 L."194 Yet, the
vague wording in the proposed plan for 2005 appears to allot almost no
spaces for refugees from either Iraq or Afghanistan, despite the
government's claim that "the U.S. program is once again open to receiving
new referrals of vulnerable Iraqi cases." 195
In addition to the political role the United States has played in Iraq and
Afghanistan since September 11, heightened security measures that reflect a
growing fear of immigrants and refugees from the Muslim world have
shaped the emerging refugee policy. 196 While a heightened attention to
security measures is understandable in light of the terrorist attacks, it is
indisputable that none of the hijackers on September 11 was a refugee or
was seeking refugee status in the United States, and that to date, no known
terrorist activity has resulted from refugee admissions. 197 The Convention
and Protocol both include provisions for excluding applicants for refugee
status who have committed serious crimes, including those who have
committed "a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity," "serious non-political crime[s]," and those "guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." 198 These
safeguards have been largely ignored as viable solutions to protecting
national security. 199
Part I of this Note described the United States' historical and current
approach to refugee admissions. Part I detailed that, in the historical
development of the refugee admissions program, refugee legislation was
based almost entirely on national self-interest and exhibited a foreign policy
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The State Department's proposed refugee admissions for 2006 from the Near
East and South Asia region rose to a total of 5000 refugees, with 2000 being admitted from
Iran, 1000 from Afghanistan, and 2000 from Iraq (the remaining 1000 slots were not
accounted for). Id. at 42-43. Yet, in mid-2006, it appears that the United States fell short of
these higher admissions and admitted only 2977 refugees from the region. Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, Fact Sheet: Refugee Admission Program for Near
East and South Asia (May 9, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/fs/2006/66018.htm. Yet,
because the final statistics from 2005 and the proposed admissions for 2007 have yet to be
released, it is not yet possible to determine from which countries these refugees were
resettled.
196. See State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78, at 42; see also Geoff Gilbert, Protection
After September 11th, 15 Int'l J. Refugee L. 1, 1 (2003) (explaining that "[p]ost-September
11 th, the industrialized countries have imposed stricter controls on applicants in the name of
security").
197. Somini Sengupta, Refugees at America's Door Find It Closed After Attacks, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 2001, at Al ("[S]omeone who wanted to come into the United States to
inflict harm would be unlikely to take the refugee route, which usually involves spending
some time living in a refugee camp, [and, as explained by Lavinia Limon, a former State
Department official in President Bill Clinton's administration,] 'often [being] on the margins
of existence."').
198. The Convention, supra note 18, art. l(F)(a)-(c); see supra Part I.A.4.
199. Gilbert, supra note 196, at 1.
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bias. Part I also discussed the impact of the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq on refugees in the region, as well as the impact of September 11 on
the refugee admissions program. Part II of this Note explores the
predominant approaches to refugee admissions programs. These
approaches include the national self-interest approach, the humanitarian
approach, and the human rights approach.
II. MODELS FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
Part II of this Note explores the three predominant approaches to shaping
refugee admissions programs. While the United States has employed
mostly the national self-interest approach, other alternatives are also
discussed below.
Because the United States seems unlikely to admit more than
approximately 70,000 refugees on a yearly basis in the foreseeable
future,200 the challenge of choosing an approach by which to admit refugees
is great.20 1  Given the large numbers of refugees worldwide and the
relatively low ceiling on the refugee admissions program in the United
States, the process of determining which refugees to admit leaves a great
deal of discretion to the President.20 2 The three approaches to refugee
selection typically cited are as follows: (1) the national self-interest
approach, which includes consideration of foreign policy goals, as
illustrated by the United States refugee admissions program and discussed
above in Part I; (2) the humanitarian approach, which aims to relieve the
suffering of large numbers of refugees confronted by disease, hunger, or
armed conflict in their home country; and (3) the human rights model,
which selects refugees individually based on human rights violations they
have suffered, thereby aiming to deter the government that committed the
violations. Part II of this Note explores these three approaches in turn.
A. Admissions Based on National Self-Interest
The national self-interest model is based on the theory that receiving
countries should use their refugee admissions program in whatever way is
most favorable to them.20 3 Thus, this model seeks to admit refugees who
will most benefit the host country politically and economically on the
domestic as well as the foreign front. This model is illustrated by the
debate at the time the Convention was codified, when "most Western states
200. See State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at vi; see also State Dep't 2006 Report,
supra note 78, at vi; Steinbock, supra note 47, at 972 (stating that "refugee admission
numbers appear highly unlikely to increase drastically").
201. See Rohde, supra note 3, at 1 ('The ideal would be... a perfect method for
weighing... fear, threat to life, torture, and incarceration... But you're never really going
to have a perfect system."' (quoting Lawrence Fuchs, then-Vice Chairman of the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform); Steinbock, supra note 47, at 955.
202. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 961. "American refugee selection is akin to being
touched by an angel." Id. at 953.
203. Hathaway, supra note 69, at 144.
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[who were parties to its codification believed] that their limited resettlement
capacity should be reserved for those whose flight was motivated by pro-
Western political values," such as a rejection of communism. 204 The
United States has adhered to this model by employing a foreign policy bias
in its refugee selection. 20 5 The United States has repeatedly admitted
refugees from countries that it sought to embarrass politically, while at the
same time barring the admission of refugees from politically friendly
nations. 20 6 "Historically, those who have fled countries friendly to the
United States-El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and others-have had
strikingly little success" in gaining admission to the United States as
refugees. 207 Proponents of American refugee policy "argue that those from
countries allied to the United States tend to be 'economic migrants' fleeing
poverty, not true refugees fleeing persecution." 208
Opponents of this model argue that refugees should be selected based on
their need for resettlement, whether due to their humanitarian situation or
their human rights predicament, as opposed to whether their admission will
benefit the host country politically, or in some other way.209 Critics also
note that "[i]n a world where information is so much more readily available
than during the Cold War, refugee acceptance seems an indirect and
inefficient means of conveying negative images" about countries with
opposing ideologies.210 Additionally, "whatever publicity value might
come from encouraging or highlighting emigration from a particular
country seems a small payoff compared to other possible uses of refugee
admissions." 211 The fact that at this time the U.S. refugee program admits
so few people also bolsters the argument that playing with these numbers
only to send a political message is likely a lost cause.212
The national self-interest approach has been characterized as conducive
to refugee resettlement when it comes to burden-sharing. 213  Burden-
sharing is the term for when receiving countries attempt to distribute the
burdens placed on host countries through financial support and through
refugee admissions, often based on their foreign policy and national self-
interest goals. 214 Professor Daniel J. Steinbock has explained that the main
goal behind burden-sharing is to preserve the right of asylum and protect
204. Id. at 148. "[T]he current framework of refugee law, even if it were to be fully and
universally implemented, is largely inconsistent with the attainment of either humanitarian or
human rights ideals on a universal scale." Id. at 144.
205. See supra Part I.
206. See supra Part I.A.
207. Legomsky, supra note 33, at 916.
208. Id.; see also Bockley, supra note 28, at 272-76.
209. Hathaway, supra note 69, at 132-33.
210. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 982; see also Arthur C. Helton, The Price of
Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century 10 (2002) (stating that
"[t]he end of the cold war reduced the ideological value of refugees in the eyes of states").
211. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 982.
212. Id.




against involuntary returns. 215  Steinbock has outlined three reasons for
burden-sharing:
First, refugees do not move evenly around the globe, both because
refugee-producing events are concentrated in particular countries or
regions, and because most refugees cannot seek sanctuary far from their
countries of origin. Second, despite the benefits individual refugees
might ultimately bring, refugee-receiving countries regard refugees as an
unwanted burden in just about every way imaginable. Third, countries
vary widely in their abilities to cope with refugees in their territory.216
He has explained that foreign policy and national self-interest purposes that
drive receiving countries to share the burden of admitting refugees with less
capable countries is a positive outcome of this approach to refugee
admissions.217
Another positive outcome to the national self-interest approach is the
category of refugees the United States created. This category is typically
recognized as a subset of the national self-interest approach because it
involves foreign policy considerations, 218 yet it differs from the typical
foreign policy considerations because it "[flavor[s] people whose
persecution or other danger the U.S. has helped to cause. '219 The United
States has tended to use this approach to select refugees in instances where
it has urged an "uprising or other resistance in another country and then
fail[ed] to follow through with military support," such as in Hungary and
Vietnam. 220 The reasoning behind refugee admissions from a country in
which the United States has interfered militarily is that "[h]aving come to
help but having failed, the U.S., in effect, is often expected to be the
guarantor of the people it sought to aid."'221
Critics of this approach argue that the moral claim of would-be refugees
varies with the particular circumstances of each case, and that "not every
'ally' necessarily becomes a refugee 'America has created' or whose 'injury
America has caused' if that common effort does not succeed. '222
Sometimes, "causal connections become muddled, and moral responsibility
less clear," particularly in instances where the threat America sought to curb
was present regardless of its involvement in the region, or when those who
allied themselves with the activities backed by the American military would
have done so even without its participation.223 Critics also note the foreign
policy bias in this subset of the national self-interest model in that the
215. Id.
216. Id. at 985.
217. Id. at 977 (stating that "[r]efugee resettlement can potentially serve a variety of
foreign policy goals and complaints of a foreign policy bias in refugee admissions do not
always acknowledge the differences").
218. Id. at 977-80.
219. Id. at 977.
220. Id. at 978; see supra Part I.A.6.a-b.
221. Id. at 980; see also Loescher & Scanlan, supra note 98, at 52-53.
222. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 980.
223. Id. at 979-80.
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government retains a great deal of discretion in determining whether it has
created refugees at all.224
B. Admissions Based on Humanitarian Need
The humanitarian model of refugee selection typically focuses on
relieving the suffering of people due to dangers such as hunger, disease, and
armed conflict. 225  The concept behind this approach is that human
suffering should not be viewed through a political prism.226 This approach
is premised on the concept that "state response[s] to refugees should be
based on [the refugees'] predicament rather than on the basis of value-laden
distinctions." 227 This model stems from the concept of charitable giving 228
in that it simply aims to help other human beings in need and does not look
to the ways in which the host country will benefit from the admitted
refugees. 229
Applying humanitarian principles, Professor Matthew J. Gibney has
argued that receiving countries should assist those in need when the cost of
helping is not great.230 He has argued that countries that refuse to raise the
overall number of admitted refugees ought to at least revamp their
immigration program so as to prioritize the admission of refugees over
relatives who are not immediate family members of citizens and to
prioritize refugee admissions over employment-based immigrants. 231 Other
observers, however, have proposed a balancing of refugees' interests
against those of the receiving country's citizens. 232 Under this model,
"affluent nations should be taking far, far more refugees than they are
taking today," and "potential refugee settlement countries should, on the
basis of the principle of equal consideration of interests, gradually increase
their refugee intakes," until the harm to the receiving country outweighs the
interests of refugees. 233
Because the admitted number of refugees to the United States does not
appear to be on the verge of increasing,2 34 however, one of the difficulties
224. Id.
225. See id. at 964-69.
226. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 33, at 916.
227. Hathaway, supra note 69, at 134.
228. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 963-64 (stating that "[alt bottom, refugee resettlement is
a question of the distribution of charity, a subject seldom touched upon in legal literature").
229. Tyson, supra note 20, at 921 (describing the conflict between the national self-
interest and humanitarian approaches through writer and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel's
words: "When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national
borders and sensitivities become irrelevant" (quoting Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace Prize
Acceptance Speech at Oslo, Norway (Dec. 10, 1986))).
230. Matthew J. Gibney, Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees, 93
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 169 (1999).
231. Id.
232. Peter Singer & Renata Singer, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, in Open Borders?
Closed Societies? 111, 128 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988).
233. Id. at 128.
234. See Steinbock, supra note 47, at 972.
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to the humanitarian approach is identifying "the principles that should guide
the distribution of lifesaving resources when the need is great, the resource
is scarce, and no one has an a priori claim."235 Typically known as the
"floodgates" problem, countries simply fear that once they begin admitting
refugees for humanitarian reasons, they will never see an end to the stream
of refugees. 236 One way to distinguish between refugees is the "degree and
probability of harm" they are likely to encounter without resettlement.237
This calculation becomes difficult, however, when the "plight of persons
facing some present danger or hardship [is] weighed against the claim of
those who have suffered past persecution but are not currently at risk."'238 It
also becomes challenging to weigh the need of those who encounter great
danger in their current location when compared to "long-stayers," refugees
who have spent years in refugee camps without a chance to return to their
home country or settle in the location of the camp. 239
If the United States were somehow to prioritize the dangers confronting
different refugee populations (i.e., prioritizing refugees from armed conflict
above those who flee disease and hunger), the problem of the order in
which to accommodate them (i.e., those fleeing armed conflict in Iraq over
those fleeing armed conflict in the Sudan) would pose a new challenge. 240
A "waiting list" approach, common to other immigration preferences,
would result in a substantial waiting period for many refugees.241 While
the waiting period may be acceptable, although arduous, for an immigrant
not facing imminent danger in her home country, a waiting list approach for
many refugees would prove deadly. 242 Alternatively, selection could be
based on the refugee's connection to the United States via relatives, a
lottery system, or by selecting "long-term refugee groups that are somewhat
self-contained, so that an entire ethnic group or at least an entire camp
population could be given a durable solution without leaving a few
behind. '243 The floodgates fear is accompanied by the belief by some that
there may exist solutions other than resettlement to curb the plight of
humanitarian refugees in their home countries. 244 Direct humanitarian aid
and "political and diplomatic pressure on the offending or failing
governments" are two alternatives. 245
235. Id. at 963.
236. See Hathaway, supra note 69, at 153-54 (explaining that during the codification of
the Convention, states "conten[ded] that it was simply not pragmatic to create a universal
refugee protection system premised on humanitarianism. There was great fear that a general
commitment to refugees would constitute a 'blank check' that would commit states in
advance to respond to future, unforeseeable events").
237. Steinbock, supra note 47, at 973.
238. Id. at 976.
239. Id. at 975.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 975-76.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 976.
244. Id. at 964.
245. Id.
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C. Admissions Based on Human Rights Considerations
As explained above in Part II.B, the humanitarian approach to refugee
admissions embraces a very large number of people, not all of whom can be
accommodated by a refugee program with a ceiling of 70,000.246 The
human rights model is meant to embrace refugees fleeing governments due
to gross human rights violations, which some commentators have argued
"'make the most forceful claim for admission. ' ' 247 This approach
"provides an enhanced ability to fine-tune the refugee determination
process, thus offering the assurance that refugee recognition is fair within
the context of an inability to meet the full range of human needs. 248 Like
the humanitarian model, however, the problem of making individualized
determinations of which refugees have suffered, or are in danger of
suffering, the "worst" kinds of human rights violations is challenging and
time-consuming. 249 Additionally, the process of determining which human
rights violations are the most horrific provides countries receiving refugees
with a large range of political discretion.250  As a result, Amnesty
International has said that "there remains in practice a fundamental [lack of
commitment by] the international community to address refugee protection
through a rights-based approach.... This fundamental failure stems largely
from a lack of political will on the part of states."251
Some observers have noted that the human rights approach is rife with
opportunities for governments to make political or national self-interest
decisions under the guise of protecting human rights.252 The asylum system
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. Mark Gibney, United States Immigration Policy and the "Huddled Masses " Myth, 3
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 361, 382 (1989) (quoting M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of
Pluralism and Equality 49 (1983)); see also Helton, supra note 210, at 10 (stating that
"[elven the most hardened foreign policy realists in the West accept as important national
interests the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world").
248. Hathaway, supra note 69, at 140.
249. Schoenholtz, supra note 17, at 336 (describing the process of political asylum
interviews in the United States, where entry is based on the violation of an applicant's
human rights, and noting that "[t]he challenges to decision-makers are.., considerable").
250. See Rohde, supra note 3, at I (quoting an Ethiopian refugee who said that "[t]here
are a lot of countries that abuse human rights, but if they're not on the American
government's list, it's not abuse"); see also Hathaway, supra note 69, at 142 (stating that
"the linkage between refugee law and human rights [has always been] selective in a way that
reinforced the economic and political hegemony of major Western states"). Hathaway
argues that immediately following the atrocities committed by the German government
during World War II "[i]t was contextually logical that refugee law should follow the more
general pattern of achieving some measure of basic protection from abusive national
authority through the adoption of a human rights strategy." Id. at 140-41. During the
codification of the Convention, however, "[t]here was.., no commitment to grounding
refugee law in the promotion of international human rights; French efforts to link refugee
status to violations of fundamental human rights and to the general human right to seek
asylum were summarily rejected as theoretical and too far removed from reality." Id. at 148
(internal quotations omitted).
251. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22.
252. See Hathaway, supra note 69, at 132; Laura Isabel Bauer, Note, They Beg for Our
Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asylum Law's Failure to Protect Many of Today's
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in the United States, which is essentially based on the human rights
approach to overseas refugees discussed above, has been criticized for
virtually the same reasons as the overseas refugee program: its national
self-interest and foreign policy bias.253 Professor James C. Hathaway has
argued that "[t]o codify a standard of conduct in international human rights
law is to remove it from the realm of pure discretion, to constrain somewhat
the scope for the exercise of power politics, and to provide a basis upon
which states may be called upon to account for their behavior."254 He goes
on to say that
[w]hile law provides no guarantee of compliance in a world of sovereign
nation states in which coercive authority is denied to the international
community, it nonetheless creates a context in which respect for basic
human rights can be addressed and at least occasionally promoted....
[R]egional and interest-driven protection [should be emphasized] because
states have proved assiduously resistant to assuming obligations viewed
as inconsistent with their own national interests.255
Under Hathaway's model, states would be encouraged to embrace refugees
whose human rights had been violated in a nearby country, or where the
receiving states' political interests were aligned with admitting the refugees.
Part II of this Note described the three predominant approaches to
refugee admissions: the national self-interest approach, the humanitarian
approach, and the human rights approach. This Note now turns to
discussing a proposal for a U.S. refugee admissions program that includes
refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq created as a result of the war on terror
by encompassing both humanitarian and human rights considerations.
III. AN AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY BASED ON HUMANITARIAN AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS THAT INCLUDES REFUGEES THE UNITED
STATES CREATED IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ AS A RESULT OF THE WAR
ON TERROR
Part III of this Note proposes that the United States admit refugees it
created in Afghanistan and Iraq by adopting a refugee policy that combines
the humanitarian and human rights approaches.
Refugees, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081 (2004); Kathryn A. Dittrick Heebner, Comment,
Protecting the Truly Persecuted: Restructuring the Flawed Asylum System, 39 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 549 (2005).
253. Bauer, supra note 252, at 1087 ("Unfortunately, political motives persist in the
administration of U.S. asylum and refugee law. Because even a nationality-neutral
definition of 'refugee' requires a conclusion that another government has actively persecuted
or failed to prevent persecution, an asylum grant involves criticism of a nation's actions or
inactions. Since 1980, the U.S. government has catered to the plea of the refugee who
'advance[s] American political objectives."' (quoting Bockley, supra note 28, at 256));
Heebner, supra note 252, at 551 (explaining that "judicial discretion [in granting or denying
asylum status] has been employed in a haphazard manner and produces illogical results").
254. Hathaway, supra note 69, at 132.
255. Id. at 132-34.
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Similar to the U.S. approach to refugee admissions during the Cold War,
the Bush Administration has curtailed admissions of refugees from
countries from which it would be politically embarrassing to accept
suffering people, namely Iraq and Afghanistan. 256 This Note proposes that
refugees the United States created should be admitted pursuant to the
humanitarian approach and that the United States should adopt a hybrid of
the human rights and humanitarian models to shape a refugee admissions
program that accepts responsibility for refugees the United States created
in Afghanistan and Iraq. When American military action results in the
displacement of thousands of people who consequently fear for their lives,
as they do in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States owes those refugees
who would benefit from resettlement that opportunity. This proposal is
explored below.
A. The Continuation of a Refugee Admissions Program Influenced by
National Self-Interest and Foreign Policy
The near absence of refugee admissions from Iraq and Afghanistan in
current years 257 is entirely in keeping with the history of the program,
which has been influenced by foreign policy and national self-interest since
World War II, when the United States enacted the Displaced Persons Act of
1948.258 The United States' pattern of favoring refugees from countries it
wishes to embarrass or harm politically,259 while at the same time turning a
blind eye to refugees from countries politically allied with the United States
or from countries it wishes to portray positively, is well established. 260 This
Note proposes that the continuing influence of national self-interest and
foreign policy are the primary reasons for the near exclusion of Afghan and
Iraqi refugees from the refugee admissions program.
The State Department has employed three explanations to defend the
dearth of refugee admissions from Afghanistan and Iraq. 261 The first is that
until approximately four years after September 11, name-checking
procedures for processing Iraqi refugees were being streamlined in the wake
of the terrorist attacks. 262 In combination with this first argument, the State
256. See Steinbock, supra note 47, at 984-85 (writing at the onset of the war in Iraq that
"[a]fter September 11, it may be said, the U.S. acquired a new ideology: anti-terrorism....
In a war that demands as much commitment in troops, casualties, foreign relations, and
funding as this one already has (and will), it is unrealistic to think that refugee admissions
will not also be used as a weapon. If refugee resettlement appears helpful in the war against
terrorism it is sure to be called upon, even at the expense of other people in greater need").
257. State Dep't 2003 Summary, supra note 21, at 19-20; State Dep't 2004 Summary,
supra note 21, at 3; State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 45; State Dep't 2006 Report,
supra note 78, at 51.
258. See supra Part I.A.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at iv, 38; State Dep't 2006 Report, supra
note 78, at 41.
262. State Dep't 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 38.
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Department has also said that at times country conditions in Iraq are so
unstable that government officials cannot enter certain parts of the country
in order to process refugees. 263 The third explanation is that, with respect
to Afghanistan (and some parts of Iraq), country conditions have improved
enough so that refugees can be returned to their home country and
repatriated or can resettle in the countries where they are currently located
(namely neighboring Pakistan) and therefore would not benefit from
resettlement in the United States.2 64
Although the streamlining of security procedures in the wake of
September 11 is a completely appropriate response to the attacks, it is
important to note that none of the hijackers on September 11, or any known
terrorist since, was a refugee, or entered the United States by way of the
refugee admissions program. 265 Additionally, given the immediate and
pressing needs of refugees, five years and counting is quite a long time for
security procedures to be streamlined. As discussed above, procedures for
screening out criminals from the refugee program were already in place as
per the Convention, and the extensive screening involved in the admission
of overseas refugees has been quite efficient in weeding out would-be
terrorists to date.266
The issue of country conditions in Iraq being so precarious that the
United States cannot enter certain parts of the country in order to process
refugees seems like a self-serving argument considering that the U.S.
military is in control of the country and has created the conditions it now
deems unstable. 267 While the security conditions in some parts of the
country are indeed unstable, it should be the singular responsibility of the
United States to devise a plan that limits the danger to government workers
so that persecuted Iraqis may be aided. The United States' explanation in
this regard is akin to one setting her neighbor's house on fire and then
declaring it too dangerous to attempt the neighbor's rescue; it is
irresponsible and absent-minded.
While the UNHCR and other countries have supported the United States'
assertions that conditions in Afghanistan are sufficiently stable to begin
repatriating some Afghans, 268 the conditions there are not necessarily so
stable that Afghans should no longer be admitted as overseas refugees.
Continuing attacks by the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as natural
occurrences such as an ongoing drought in the region, continue to produce
refugees. 269 So long as the U.S. presence in Afghanistan continues under
263. Id. at iv.
264. State Dep't 2006 Report, supra note 78, at 41 (stating that "[w]ith repatriation now a
reality for Afghans, and a real possibility for many Iraqis, we expect to process only those
vulnerable refugees who cannot return to their homes from those countries").
265. See Sengupta, supra note 197, at B6.
266. See supra Part I.A.4.
267. See supra Part I.B.2.
268. See supra Part I.B. 1.
269. See supra Part I.B. 1.
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the guise of rebuilding and improving conditions for Afghans, the United
States should not also refuse to admit Afghan refugees for whom it would
be dangerous to remain.
While the State Department's explanations for the low refugee
admissions from Afghanistan and Iraq are plausible, the more likely
explanation is that the United States has been guided by national self-
interest and foreign policy objectives in admitting fewer and fewer refugees
from these countries. The current trend in refugee admissions from these
countries can be compared to admissions during the Cold War. As in the
Cold War, the United States is currently engaged in an ideological battle in
which it is attempting to "win the hearts and minds" of many people around
the world in order to garner support for its military action in the "war on
terror."270  Just as the United States was also interested in winning a
worldwide propaganda war during the Cold War, public relations have
played a dramatic role in the Bush administration's war on terror as the
government has attempted to win support by swaying both the American
electorate and potential allies abioad. 271 During the Cold War, the United
States utilized refugee admissions to discredit governments with opposing
ideologies by admitting their refugees.272  Given the current U.S.
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, it would be entirely
unseemly to admit that the United States both created refugees there and
now needs to resettle them in the United States. The diminished admissions
of refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq correlate to the United States'
interest in positively portraying the situations in those countries and is a
manifestation of the national self-interest approach to refugee admissions.
B. Adhering to the Spirit of the Act, Convention, and Protocol
Part III.B of this Note proposes that the United States adhere to the spirit
of the Act, Convention, and Protocol by adopting a refugee admissions
program that does not politically discriminate against refugees according to
their country of origin.
Apart from the tragic humanitarian implications of the exclusion of
Afghan and Iraqi refugees from the current refugee admissions program, 273
the disturbing trend since September 11 contradicts the politically neutral
spirit and language of the Act, the Convention, and the Protocol. 274 Even
though the Convention allows states to make their own determinations of
who deserves refugee protection, thereby "add[ing] significantly to the
scope for ideologically influenced interpretations," 275 states are still
270. See supra Part I.A. 1-3, B. 1-2.
271. See supra Part I.B.1.
272. See supra Part I.A. 1-3.
273. See supra Part I.B.1-2.
274. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
275. Hathaway, supra note 69, at 150.
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supposed to adhere to the politically neutral language of the Convention.
One observer has noted,
In practice, the lack of any meaningful international scrutiny of the
procedural dimensions of refugee protection has allowed political and
strategic interests to override humanitarian concerns in the determination
of refugee status, has facilitated the interposition of domestic economic
and social considerations in deciding which persons and groups are to be
assisted, and has resulted in a variety of interpretations of the Convention,
thereby undercutting the universality of the protection mandate.276
Yet, the United States ought to play a leadership role in this area by proving
that refugee admissions can be based on humanitarian and human rights
considerations, and not biased by foreign policy and national self-interest
considerations that serve to exclude deserving refugees.
C. Classifying the Moral Obligation of the United States to Refugees the
United States Created as Part of the Humanitarian Approach to Refugee
Admissions
Part III.C of this Note argues that refugees the United States has created
be admitted pursuant to the humanitarian approach to refugee admissions.
The model for admitting refugees the United States created is practically
the antithesis of the national self-interest model, under which U.S. refugee
policy is typically categorized because of its consideration of foreign
policy-related events.277 It stems more from the charitable, moralistic
instinct that drives the humanitarian model278 rather than from the self-
focused model that uses foreign policy as its guide. 279 The admission of
refugees the United States created serves the role of an apology for botched
military actions 280 rather than the furtherance of political goals.
Although in past instances when refugees the United States created were
admitted to the United States the military activities that involved the United
States were largely over,281 the fact that the military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan are ongoing should not impede the admission of refugees from
these countries. There are thousands of civilians currently in danger of
religious and political persecution, insurgent attacks, and armed conflict due
to the actions of the U.S. government. Their exclusion from the refugee
admissions program denies them one possible solution to their plight.282
276. Id. at 167-68.
277. See supra Part II.A.
278. See supra Part IIA-B.
279. See supra Part II.A.
280. See supra Part I.A.6.a-b.
281. See supra Part I.A.6.a-b.
282. Sengupta, supra note 197, at A l (stating that "if the Sept. 11 hijackings exposed the
alarmingly large gaps in the government's ability to track who comes into the country, they
also made indirect casualties out of otherwise deserving refugees").
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D. Incorporating Human Rights and Humanitarian Considerations into the
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
Part III.D of this Note proposes that the United States incorporate the
humanitarian and human rights approaches to refugee admissions into its
admissions program.
The United States could incorporate humanitarian and human rights
considerations into its refugee admissions program, particularly when it
comes to Afghan and Iraqi refugees, by applying aspects of Steinbock's and
Hathaway's suggestions discussed above regarding burden-sharing and
region-related considerations. 283 The burden-sharing vehicle, in which an
interested nation provides support or resettlement opportunities to refugees
currently hosted by another nation,284 would allow the United States to
admit both Afghan and Iraqi refugees who have fled their countries for
either humanitarian or human rights-related reasons. Given the United
States' interest in stabilizing conditions in these countries, it would seem
that a region-related approach by which the United States could assist local,
endangered refugees would greatly enhance its goal of maintaining order
there. Additionally, providing humanitarian and human-rights based aid in
the form of refugee resettlement could serve to enhance the United States'
image in these countries, rather than cause political embarrassment.
CONCLUSION
Past instances of reform in the U.S. refugee admissions program have
been spurred by public outcry and powerful lobbying groups. 285 A public
movement to urge the President to admit refugees from Afghanistan and
Iraq does not seem entirely out of reach given the current unpopularity of
the U.S. presence in Iraq.2 86 Some observers have noted that
[t]oday's Congress does not seem awash in humanitarian goodwill.
It included provisions in the intelligence reform bill enacted in
December 2004 that bespeak a mood of hostility and deep
skepticism toward asylees, which could easily spill over onto those
283. See supra Part II.A, C.
284. See supra Part II.A.
285. See supra Part I.A. 1, 5-6.
286. Danner, supra note 136, at 47 (stating that "[a]s the Iraq war grows increasingly
unpopular in the United States-scarcely a third of Americans now approve of the
president's handling of the war, and 4 in 10 think it was worth fighting-and as more and
more American leaders demand that the administration 'start figuring out how we get out of
there' (in the words of Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican), Americans confront a stark
choice: whether to go on indefinitely fighting a politically self-destructive
counterinsurgency war that keeps the jihadists increasingly well supplied with volunteers or
to withdraw from a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq that remains chaotic and unstable and beset




admitted through the resettlement program, if amendments to that
program are offered.287
Yet, Congress alone does not make the determination of which refugees are
admitted.288 The President plays the most crucial role in determining whom
to admit and could make the determination alone.289
As the events of September 11 demonstrate, it is undoubtedly in this
country's best interest that desperate people abroad are not permitted to
stew in conditions that could breed a destructive ideology. 290
"[C]ompassion for refugees and concern for the national interest are not
mutually exclusive. Rather, including humanitarian 'compassion' as a
separate criterion on which to allocate refugee admissions serves the
national interest because it helps preserve the United States' credibility in
politically unstable, refugee producing regions."'291 Allotting the limited
number of slots that the government holds for overseas refugees to victims
of human rights abuses and to those who would be best served by a
humanitarian response that includes resettlement in this country,
particularly when the United States has taken part in creating their situation,
would promote a broader and more enduring type of national self-interest
than a policy that continues to politicize persecuted refugees.
287. Martin, supra note 181.
288. See supra Part I.A.4.
289. See supra Part I.A.4.
290. Tyson, supra note 20, at 931.
291. Id.
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